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Abstract 
There are two key characteristic of animal and human societies: (1) degree heterogeneity, 
meaning that not all individual have the same number of associates; and (2) the interaction 
topology is not static, i.e. either individuals interact with different set of individuals at 
different times of their life, or at least they have different associations than their parents. 
Earlier works have shown that population structure is one of the mechanisms promoting 
cooperation. However, most studies had assumed that the interaction network can be 
described by a regular graph (homogeneous degree distribution). Recently there are an 
increasing number of studies employing degree heterogeneous graphs to model interaction 
topology. But mostly the interaction topology was assumed to be static. Here we investigate 
the fixation probability of the cooperator strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma, when interaction 
network is a random regular graph, a random graph or a scale-free graph and the interaction 
network is allowed to change. 
We show that the fixation probability of the cooperator strategy is lower when the interaction 
topology is described by a dynamical graph compared to a static graph. Even a limited 
network dynamics significantly decreases the fixation probability of cooperation, an effect 
that is mitigated stronger by degree heterogeneous networks topology than by a degree 
homogeneous one. We have also found that from the considered graph topologies the 
decrease of fixation probabilities due to graph dynamics is the lowest on scale-free graphs. 
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Introduction 
While cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature (Dugatkin, 1997), the mechanisms 
behind its evolution and maintenance are still not fully explored. Population structure has 
been proposed as one of the mechanism promoting cooperation (Nowak, 2006; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 2000). Until recently, most studies assumed that the interaction network can be 
described by a regular graph, which is indeed the case if the players are spatially confined. 
Ohtsuki et al. (2006) have shown for a number of other interaction topologies that selection 
favours cooperation (i.e. the fixation probability of a single cooperator is higher than the 
fixation probability of a neutral mutant) in the prisoner’s dilemma game if the benefit (b) of 
the altruistic act divided by its cost (c) exceeds the average number of neighbours (k), that is, 
if b/c > k. They found this relation to be approximately valid if they use the so called “death-
birth” update rule (details see below) in populations of different structure, in which interaction 
topology is described variously by regular, random regular, random, or scale-free graphs. 
Recently, Taylor et al. (2007) have proved mathematically that this relation is approximately 
valid for bi-transitive graphs. Furthermore similar relationship can be derived considering 
inclusive fitness (Lehman et al., 2007). 
Both Ohtsuki et al. (2006) and Taylor and Nowak (2006) have assumed that the graph is 
static during evolution. This assumption implies that a newborn individual (or accepted 
strategy-by-imitation) in a given position interacts with exactly the same individuals that were 
connected to every preceding individual at this position. Dispersal from the natal patch 
(mostly by males) is widespread in Nature. Furthermore animal social structure exhibits both 
rapid changes and long term association (e.g. bottlenose dolphins (Connor et al., 1999); sperm 
whales (Whitehead, 1995; Whitehead, 1997); long-finned pilot whale (Ottensmeyer and 
Whitehead, 2003)). Dynamic social connection is characteristic of fission-fusion societies 
(e.g. chimpanzee (Mitani et al., 2002); spider monkey (Ramos-Fernández, 2005); onager and 
Grevy’s zebra (Sundaresan et al., 2007); African buffalo (Cross et al., 2005); African elephant 
(Couzin, 1996)). As social networks are not static, the effect of assuming static interaction 
topology clearly needs attention. Parallely, some recent papers studied the evolution of 
cooperation on dynamical networks. They either studied the fixation probability of a single 
cooperator among defectors in the case when graph dynamics is much faster than the 
dynamics of evolution (Pacheco et al., 2006a), or if the relative speed of graph and 
evolutionary dynamics were varied systematically they assumed that cooperators and 
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defectors were in the same fraction initially in the population (Pacheco et al., 2006b; Santos et 
al., 2006a). 
Here we investigate how sensitive is the fixation probability of a single cooperator to the 
network dynamics, if graph dynamics is slow relative to the evolution. 
Methods 
In order to allow comparison we considered the same methodology as in Ohtsuki et al. 
(2006). Namely, a population is considered where the interactions are described by a graph 
that can vary in time. The population of 100N = 1
bi ck−
 individuals consist of defectors and 
cooperators. An individual derives its payoff, P from interactions with adjacent individuals. A 
cooperator helps all individuals to whom it is connected, thus it pays a cost (c) for each of its 
neigbour. Neigbours of a cooperator receive the benefit (b). Generally, if a cooperator is 
connected to k other individuals and i of those are cooperators, then its payoff is . A 
defector does not provide any help, and therefore has no costs, but it can receive the benefit 
from neighbouring cooperators. If a defector is connected to j cooperators, then its payoff is 
bj. The fitness of the a player is given by 1 w wPΦ = − + , where w measures the intensity of 
the selection. Here we assume weak selection where the payoff is small compared to the 
baseline fitness ( 1w ). (Other possibility is to normalize P by the number of neighbours of 
the individuals. In this case the beneficial effect of graph degree heterogeneity disappears 
(Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Szolnoki et al., 2008) 
Following Ohtsuki et al. (2006) we employed a “death-birth” updating scheme, where 
at each update a randomly chosen individual dies; and subsequently the neighbours compete 
for the empty site in proportion to their fitness. Accordingly, the probability that neighbour i 
occupies the emptied site is 
1
ik
i j
j=
Φ Φ∑ , where the fitness of all neighbours are summed. 
(Alternatively three other update rules can be considered, which is called “birth-death”, 
“imitation” and “pairwise comparison” (for details see Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). By using 
“death-birth”, “imitation” or “pairwise comparison” rules evolution of the cooperative 
strategy is probable if b/c is high enough. However, “birth-death” updating rule has been 
demonstrated to be detrimental to the evolution of cooperation very close to the ones gained 
                                                 
1  (Ohtsuki et al. (2006) have also simulated a population of 500N =  individuals, with similar results 
as for 100N = , thus the use of smaller population is justified. 
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from a well mixed population (see e.g. Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2008; 
Ohtsuki et al., 2007). 
We have considered three different graph topologies: random regular graphs, random 
graphs and scale-free graphs. In each case the mean connectivity of the graphs (k) were 
varied. The graphs were generated as in Ohtsuki et al. (2006), although there are other 
methods of generating the employed graphs, but we wanted our results to be directly 
comparable to one of the most eminent prior study in this field. For random regular graphs 
(RRG), the links between nodes are randomly drawn under the constraint that every node 
ends up with an equal number of links, k. In order to ensure connectedness of the network, 
every node is first linked to a random node of the already connected ones. Random graphs 
(RG) are generated in much the same way as RRG, but relaxing the constraint that every node 
has the same number of links to having k links on average. As for RRG, we first need to make 
sure that the graph is connected. In a second step two randomly drawn nodes are linked. The 
second step is repeated until kN links have been distributed. Scale-free networks are generated 
according to the method of preferential attachment (Albert and Barabási, 2002). 
The interaction network was allowed to change. After each update, ω fraction of the 
edges belonging to the site being updated was changed. The edge between the focal site and a 
randomly selected neighbour was exchanged with the edge connecting a randomly chosen site 
to its neighbour. For example, if A and B, and C and D, were originally connected, then after 
the update, A is connected to C, and B is connected to D. Because the number of edges 
belonging to a site never changes, the edge distribution of the graphs remain unchanged 
(Farkas et al., 2004; Maslov and Sneppen, 2002; Xulvi-Brunet et al., 2003). 
In numerical simulations, we then measured the fixation probability of a single 
cooperator at different levels of graph dynamics (ω), different average numbers of neighbours 
(k), and variations in the benefit to cost ratio (b/c). The initial cooperator was placed in a 
randomly chosen node. For each parameter combination we have constructed 1000 graphs, 
and on each graph the simulation was repeated 1000 times. The total number of repetitions (n) 
was thus one million. We computed the number of cases ( Cn ) when the single cooperator 
spreaded and fixated in the population. Thus we estimated the average fixation probability 
/C Cp n n= . Fixation of the cooperative strategy is supported if this probability is higher than 
the fixation of a neutral mutant, that is if 1/Cp n= . 
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Results  
Numerical simulations show that the fixation probability of a cooperator is clearly lower 
than in the corresponding static graph model, even if the graph dynamics are set to be slow 
(Fig 1). The slower the dynamics the bigger the speed of decrease in fixation probability, 
indicating the sensitivity the results of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) to the assumption of static graphs 
(Fig 2). For example, while the b/c > k relation is roughly valid for the static random-regular, 
and random graphs, it changes approximately to b/c > (3/2) k, even if only 10% of the 
newborn individual's connections change randomly (Fig 1.d and e). Interestingly decreasing 
of fixation probabilities with increasing graph dynamics is less intense if the interaction 
structure is described by a scale-free graph comparing to either the random or the random 
regular graph (Fig. 1.c and f). Naturally, it remains still valid that increasing b/c and 
decreasing k increases the fixation probability of cooperator. 
Edge swapping cannot be implemented in regular graphs. Instead, individuals were 
exchanged to simulate changes in the interaction network (which is not edge swapping per 
se). Here again, we found that fixation probabilities decreased rapidly with increasing graph 
dynamics (data not shown). Thus, changes in the interaction network have the same 
 
Figure 1 - Fixation probabilities of a single cooperator on static graphs (a-c) and on dynamic 
graphs (d-f), as a function of the benefit-to-cost ratio. 
Mean number of neighbours (k) is 4 (open squares), 6 (circles), 8 (filled squares) or 10 (upward 
triangles). Graph dynamics in (d-f) are set to ω = 0.1. The strength of selection is w = 0.01 in all 
cases.  
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qualitative effect as in the other graphs, 
even though direct comparison of the 
regular graph with the others is not 
possible. 
Discussion 
We found that dynamics in the 
interaction network lowers the fixation 
probability of the cooperative strategy. It 
is trivial that in the limit of very fast 
network dynamic we arrive at the well 
mixed case, where defection is the only 
ESS. This limit could have been reached 
in a qualitatively different way. For 
example fixation probability drops 
significantly only at very high values of 
network dynamic, or it may decrease 
linearly with increasing network 
dynamics. These were found to be not the 
cases, as even a very small amount of 
dynamic decreased fixation probability 
significantly. Thus, studying static graphs 
might lead us to the conclusion that the 
evolution of cooperation is easy. 
However, it is not the case in the more 
realistic setting, where the interaction network is changing, and the linking dynamic is slow 
and linking is not preferential. 
In our investigation the network dynamics was slow and the relinking random. The rate 
of link change was comparable to the rate of deaths and births of individuals. We employed 
these slow rates to show that even this causes significant effect. There is evidence that stable 
association that only change with death and birth do exist in nature (e.g. Karczmarski et al., 
2005). This can serve as a base line: there is always some topological change in the 
interaction network, it cannot be static. Because in most cases generations are overlapping, 
 
Figure 2. Fixation probabilities of a single 
cooperator on dynamic graphs as a function 
of the intensity of graph dynamics. Mean 
number of neighbours (k is 4 (open squares), 
6 (circles), 8 (filled squares) or 10 (upward 
triangles). Graph dynamics in (d-f) are set to ω = 
0.1. The strength of selection is w = 0.01 and 
b/c=k in all cases.  
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parents and offspring cannot have exactly the same interaction topology, thus graph dynamic 
is always present. And even if generations are non-overlapping the environmental fluctuations 
and stochastic demography will cause change in interaction topology. However, we can ask 
whether frequency of change in interaction is under evolution? Our results suggest that having 
zero graph dynamic is evolutionarily more favourable, than having any other amount, 
assuming that graph topology has not changed and rewiring of graph is random. However, as 
stated above, this state cannot be realized. Still, the frequency of interaction change is under 
evolutionarily pressure. However, most of these pressures are not associated with cooperation. 
For example in fission-fusion societies, interaction network changes, for example, because of 
temporal change of available food (chimpanzees: Lehmann and Boesch, 2004; Lehmann et 
al., 2007; African elephants: Wittemeyer et al., 2005; zebras: Rubenstein and Hack, 2004). 
Thus there is selection pressure on the behaviour producing fission and the subsequent fusion 
of the groups. 
We employed random relinking in order to focus on the effect of network change. A 
behaviour which selectively aborts interaction with cheaters and/or search the partnership of 
cooperators can have positive fitness consequences. Active linking has been shown to benefit 
cooperation (Pacheco et al., 2006a), but there are two effects in play: that of network change, 
and that of the preferential choice of individuals to create or to break links with others. Here 
we have shown that network dynamic alone is harmful to cooperation, and thus we infer that 
active linking can mitigate its effect (this will be studied in an upcoming paper). The 
detrimental effect of randomness in partnership was demonstrated by Vukov and Szabó 
(2004) for a spatial PD with voluntary participation (i.e. there is a third strategy, the Loner 
besides Cooperation and Defection (Szabó and Hauert, 2002)). In their model a small fraction 
of the links in the regular network is temporarily replaced by random links. They have found 
that cooperation decreases with increased randomness in the system, and even a very small 
amount (around 8%) of randomization results in loss of the cooperating strategy (Vukov and 
Szabó, 2004). 
We have shown that from the considered graph topologies the decrease of fixation 
probabilities due to graph dynamics is the lowest on scale-free graphs (Fig. 1). Degree 
heterogeneity is the highest on the scale-free graph among the employed graphs, and mean 
fixation probability at a given b/c is the lowest on such graphs (Fig. 1). We have found that 
fixation probability increased with the degree of the first cooperator node. 
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Interestingly, a power law distribution was found to describe human cooperation 
networks (Barabási, 2002; Ebel et al., 2002; Smith, 2002). Lusseau (2003) found scale-free 
behaviour for large connectivities in a social network of bottlenose dolphins. While 
population sizes are usually smaller than required for indicating a scale-free degree 
distribution in social associations, some facts suggest that the structure of animal association 
network might resemble these graphs. Associations are not random, and certain individuals 
act as hubs for the society. Older females are identified as hubs in bottlenose dolphins 
(Lusseau, 2003) and in African elephants (McComb et al., 2001). It seems that certain pigs 
are more “popular” than others (Durell et al., 2004), an observation which was also made for 
other domestic animals. Spotted hyenas females tend to associate more with higher ranking 
females (Smith et al., 2007). Degree heterogeneity seems to be common in animal societies; 
and it promotes cooperation (Santos et al., 2006b). Here we have shown that the scale-free 
network structure buffers the effect of change in association, which is always present in the 
network. 
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